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Abstract: 
 
Immigrant access to social protection in the Netherlands has changed quite markedly over 
time. This paper discusses the changes from an historical perspective and introduces a 
theoretical framework (the Welfare Pentagon) explaining how immigrants cope with 
(economic) hardship when they do not have access to formal social protection. The 
relationship between migrants and social protection in the Netherlands has been and still 
is marked by asymmetries in entitlements and contributions (taxes). Shifting notions of 
fairness throughout time to both documented and undocumented migrants are noticed and 
interpreted. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Immigrant access to social protection in the Netherlands has changed quite markedly over 
time. This paper discuss the changes from a historical perspective and introduces a 
theoretical framework (the Welfare Pentagon) explaining how immigrants cope with 
(economic) hardship when they do not have access to formal social protection. The 
relationship between migrants and social protection in the Netherlands has been and still 
is marked by asymmetries in entitlements and contributions (taxes). Shifting notions of 
fairness throughout time to both documented and undocumented migrants are noticed and 
interpreted. This paper explains these historical developments and gives 
recommendations (best practices) to fix some the many asymmetries in entitlements and 
contributions. 
 
Social protection is defined as “the range of public, private, formal and informal 
measures that address actors’ (individuals’, households’ and communities’) vulnerability 
to outcomes that negatively affect their well-being (typically defined in terms of 
consumption and income)” (Sabates-Wheeler & Macauslan, 2007). Migration and social 
protection is an understudied topic in the social protection literature. Holtzman, Koettl 
and Chernetsky (2005) and Koettl, Holzmann, & Scarpetta (2006), for instance, only 
discuss migration and social protection in the context of portability of pensions, health 
care and social security benefits, for legal working migrants and often only for the highly 
skilled. Holtzman (2005) emphasizes the role of migrants as helping natives to pay for 
their social protection (under the treat of being underfunded because of the demographic 
situation in many countries). Song & Appleton (2008) focus on work related entitlements 
which are not granted to migrants coming from rural to urban areas in China.  This paper 
wants to look thoroughly at one country (the Netherlands) along a range of migration and 
social protections issues including access and portability of benefits and coping strategies 
in case formal social protection is lacking. 
 
Section 2 gives an overview of the immigration situation in the Netherlands from the 
1950s to the present. Section 3 discusses documented/legal immigrants and their access 
to social protection. The specific case of refugees and asylum seekers is also discussed 
here. Section 4 surveys the specific situation of undocumented/illegal immigrants. It 
looks at the current provisions (mainly the lack of them for this particular group) and 
discusses other ways that these migrants deal with risk through the Welfare Pentagon 
framework.  
 
2 Immigration in the Netherlands 
 
Starting in the early 1950’s, immigration in the Netherlands has shown a positive trend 
and from the early sixties onwards the nation has been a country of strong immigration 
(until recently). The history of immigration after WWII in the Netherlands can be 
grouped into four periods:  
(1) 1945 – 1960: immigration predominantly from former colonies;  
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(2) 1960 – 1973: labour demand driven immigration from Southern Europe and 
North Africa;  
(3) 1974 – 1997: immigration of family members of migrant workers and asylum 
seekers as quantitatively the most important groups;  
(4) 1997 – 2007: curbing immigration on family reunification grounds and asylum, 
lower immigration of low skilled workers and increasing recruitment of higher 
skilled migrant workers.  
Access to social protections for these different groups has changed over time and with 
shifting notions of fairness.  
 
Changes in migration policies have followed a sequence of strong and explicit views on 
the place of migrants in the Dutch society. These views have been changing and shifting 
from the desirability of temporary labor-demand-driven migration in the 1960’s and 
1970’s, over stimulating permanent migration of workers and their families in the 1980s 
and 1990s, to encouraging circular migration of high-skilled workers in the last years. 
The views on whether and how the migrant workers should and can integrate into the 
Dutch society are relatively independent from the economic needs in terms of the demand 
for labour. The resulting reactive character of Dutch migration policies is important. 
Policies tended to recognize rather than organise migration flows and tried to adapt to the 
newly identified realities. This was especially the case in the 20th century. Over the last 
decade, policies intended to be more pro-active and aimed at curbing certain types of 
migration, although a significant reactive element is maintained as well. 
 
The decolonization process starting in 1945 with Indonesia and ending in the 1980’s with 
Surinam, boosted immigration in the Netherlands in several waves. In the former case, 
approximately 350.000 people used the right to “repatriate”. Together with residents of 
Indonesia, many Moluccan soldiers having served in the Dutch army in Indonesia, 
immigrated with their families in that period (1945 – 1950) as well. The independence of 
Surinam in 1975, made many residents of that country, having doubts on the economic 
and political stability of the colony becoming independent, moved to the European part of 
the Kingdom since Surinamese inhabitants where given the option of Dutch citizenship. 
Just before visa restrictions were put into place of the Surinamese in the 1980s, another 
inflow of Surinamese left the country.  
 
The Netherlands started to feel the excess demand for labour only at the end of the 1950’s. 
In the absence of an organised public policy, it was the employers who organised the 
recruitment of migrant workers mainly from the Mediterranean countries. The 
government responded by signing so-called “recruitment agreements” with the sending 
countries; first with Italy in 1960 and later with most of the other Mediterranean countries 
(Spain: 1961; Portugal: 1963; Turkey: 1964; Greece: 1966; Morocco: 1969; Yugoslavia 
and Tunisia: 1970). The recruitment agreements formalised the practise that workers 
could enter the Netherlands officially after having obtained a work permit for the 
Netherlands in their country of origin. However, many workers first came in as tourists 
and obtained the necessary documents only upon finding a job. Although nowadays these 
workers would be regarded as “illegal”, the pressure of the labour market in that period 
was high enough for the government not to impose strict rules on immigrating workers.  
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The first oil-crisis in 1973 and especially the economic downturn after 1979, had large 
effects on immigration in the Netherlands, less so on the absolute numbers, but more on 
the composition of the migrant population. It had, however, a major impact on the public 
(and political) view on immigration and its function and consequences. In order to 
understand these changes it is important to specify the prevailing positions on 
immigration and migration policies in the 1960’s and the first half of the 1970’s. 
 
“The Netherlands is not an immigration country and should not become one” was the 
official position of the Dutch government in 1974.  The first official document that 
formulated a coherent policy view on immigration dates from 1970 (Memorandum 
Foreign Employees – “Nota Buitenlandse Werknemers”) and already had specified that 
the Netherlands was not an immigration country. It argued that the Dutch economy 
needed foreign labour to sustain economic growth but formalised the largely shared 
unofficial view, that migrant workers are appreciated but temporary transients in the 
Dutch society. They were welcome as “guest-workers” (the Dutch word “gastarbeider” 
copied the German equivalent), but are not supposed to become genuine parts of the 
Dutch society. There is no need to integrate them since they will leave when they are not 
needed anymore. Recognizing, however, that there might be a structural need for foreign 
workers, the Memorandum of 1970 introduced the idea of contracts of very limited 
duration (2 years) guaranteeing that individual workers would not stay in the country for 
protracted periods but allowing nevertheless the economy to use immigration to deal with 
shortages in labour supply. The concept of circular migration was not yet very popular, 
but the official policy note proposed to and aimed at “rotating” foreign workers between 
their sending country and the Netherlands. It should be noted that this was consistent with 
the reality on the ground: the majority of the workers in that period were male and came 
without their families; in the early 1970’s there were 55.000 Turkish and Moroccan guest 
workers and only 20.000 family members.  
 
The slowdown in economic growth in the 1970’s and the economic downturn in the early 
eighties did change the demand for (foreign) labour. It, however, did not change the 
migrant population in a proportional way. Many European foreign workers returned to 
their country of origin, but especially the workers stemming from Turkey and Morocco 
(and also the ex-Surinamese as they became Dutch citizens) did not. They stayed in the 
country and by their very presence, put pressure on the government to adapt its policy on 
migration and integration. In the 1974 new “Memorandum of Reply”, it was explicitly 
stated that the Netherlands had responsibilities to the guest workers and that therefore, a 
policy to accommodate them in the Dutch society as long as they would remain in the 
country, was imperative. This accommodating policy had two main elements: giving 
guest workers improved access to public services/social security and providing cultural 
support. As for the access to public services, housing was a priority but later, as migrant 
workers became more regionally concentrated, municipalities started to provide better 
access to health care, social assistance based income support and education. The cultural 
programmes emphasised ethnic (related to the sending country) based education and 
mother-tongue teaching, all aimed at facilitating future return. The Netherlands became 
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the “reluctant host” for the guest workers, needing them to fill the vacancies and 
accommodating them to live decently in the country but providing facilities that were 
believed to stimulate and facilitate their expected return. 
 
By the mid-1970’s it became the aim of the government policy to restrict labour 
immigration to a strict minimum tightening controls on entry and using quota on the 
sending country- and on the company level (still using working permits as the main 
instrument). Starting in 1973 and formalised by the Foreign Employee Act (“Wet 
Buitenlandse Werknemers”) in 1979, it was stipulated that no foreign worker will be 
allowed to settle permanently into the country “unless there are compelling reason to 
allow it”. In practice this implied that labour immigration continued to be possible even 
after the Netherlands proclaimed itself “closed to labour immigration”. Despite the fact 
that admission continued to be regarded as a temporary matter and that employers had to 
prove that there were no suitable employees to be found within the European Economic 
Area (EEA), labour immigration was still allowed under the 1979 act (to be replaced in 
1995 by a new act) when it was considered beneficial to the Dutch economy. Next to 
work permits as an instrument, the introduction of visa requirements for countries with a 
high emigration potential (Turkey, Morocco and Surinam) were introduced; visa, 
however, were (and are) closely linked to work permits and had little autonomous effect 
except in the case of Surinam (see above). 
 
Despite the policy efforts, the objective of cutting down the number of new immigrants 
was never reached, not due to an increasing number of labour immigrants, but because of 
an increasing number of people immigrating in the country for reason related to family 
reunification and family formation. The total number of non-Western immigrants more 
than tripled between 1975 and 1985 from less than 200,000 to approximately 600,000 
(total Dutch population was approximately 15 million in that period). The increase was to 
a large extent due to migrating partners and children joining labour migrants from the 
1960’s and the first half of the 1970’s.  
 
Immigration due to family unification and formation became the most important reason 
for immigration already in the late 1970’s; it peaked in 1983 – 1984 and stayed important 
afterwards. During the 1980’s numerous projects on the national as well as on the local 
level were started to provide better educational opportunities, improved chances on the 
labour market and access to social housing (previously impossible).  
 
The liberal family migration policy as part of the new integration effort continues to 
attract yearly between 20.000 and 30.000 new migrants until very recently. At the end of 
the 1980’s and especially the beginning of the 1990’s these migrants were joined by an 
even bigger flood of asylum seekers. While throughout the 1970’s and the 1980’s the 
Netherlands was chosen by a small couple of thousands of asylum seekers every year, 
their number increased to 14,000  in 1988 and further exploded to yearly peaks of 53,000 
(1995) and 45,000 (1999 – 2001). In these years between 15.000 and 20.000 new asylum 
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seekers immigrated in the Netherlands every year; these migrants added to the 
approximately 22,000 family migrants yearly.  
 
When the Netherlands and other countries tightened the criteria for a refugee status and 
reconsidered social assistance in cash in 2001, the number of asylum application dropped 
significantly. In the case of the Netherlands, the tightening of the access to asylum was 
realised through an administrative action linking all social economic data-bases 
electronically allowing the authorities to identify and allocate illegal or irregular 
immigrants whenever they would use the administration, health services, schools or parts 
of the social security administration. The so-called “Linkage Act” made it more easy for 
the administration to identify the irregular asylum cases. Moreover, it discouraged 
irregular asylum seeking by making access to the social system of the country more 
difficult. The combination of the more legal restrictions, a faster procedure and the 
linkage seem to have led to a serious drop in the number of asylum seekers.   
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the types of migration from 1995 to 2004. It is clear that 
for this nine year period family migration has brought in the largest number of migrants 
followed by asylum seeks (dropping off drastically in the last years). Legal labor 
migration and other forms of migration have steadily increased but remained small in 
comparison. 
 
Figure 1: Non-western immigrants by year of arrival and migration motive (in 
absolute numbers) 
 
 
Source: SCP, Jaarrapport Integratie 2007, p. 31. 
 
other motives: study, internship family migration
labour asylum
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Table 1 shows the top ten migrant communities in the Netherlands. Four of the countries 
included are European Union Member States (Germany, Belgium, the UK and Poland). 
Current and former colonies make up another three countries (Indonesia, Suriname, the 
Dutch Antilles and Aruba). The former guest worker countries (Turkey and Morocco) 
add substantially to the total and refugees from former Yugoslavia round out the top ten. 
Non-western migrants make up over half of total immigrants. 
 
Table 1: Migrant community1 in The Netherlands by country of origin: 2007 Total 
and top 10. 
Country of origin Total 1st generation 
1. Indonesia 389.940 126.048 
2. Germany 381.186 101.221 
3. Turkey 368.600 195.113 
4. Suriname 333.504 186.025 
5. Morocco 329.493 167.893 
6. Dutch Antilles & Aruba 129.965 78.907 
7. Belgium 112.224 36.126 
8. Former Yugoslavia 76.465 52.857 
9. UK 75.686 42.604 
10. Poland 51.339 34.831 
Total 3.170.406 1.601.194 
Total Non-Western 1.738.452 1.014.476 
1 Defined as persons born abroad or with at least one parent born abroad. 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008. 
 
3 Immigrants and social protection in the Netherlands 
 
According to Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2008), all persons (legally) 
residing in the Netherlands are required by law to be insured under the National 
Insurance Schemes. All persons who work in the Netherlands and, consequently, pay 
income tax, are also insured. All employees are compulsorily insured under the insurance 
schemes for employees.  
 
Apart from National Insurance Schemes, there are also social provisions that supplement 
insufficient (family) incomes, bringing them up to the minimum guaranteed income level 
for a particular domestic situation. The main social provisions are the Supplementary 
Benefits Act, the Wajong (Disablement Assistance Act for Handicapped Young Persons), 
the Act on Income Provisions for Older or Partially Disabled Unemployed Persons 
(IOAW), the Act on Income Provisions for Older or Partially Disabled Formerly Self-
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employed Persons (IOAZ), the Work and Social Assistance Act (WWB) and the Work 
and Artist Income Act (WWIK). More information about the different schemes can be 
seen in the Appendix. People residing in the Netherlands illegally have no entitlement to 
national insurance and welfare benefits (social protection for undocumented migrants will 
be discussed in Section 4). 
 
In theory, all legal immigrants in the Netherlands have access to these provisions, but in 
practice, non-permanent residents have little access to social provisions. The modern 
migration and social benefits acts link the eventual claim of a migrant on a social benefit 
to the eventual loss of (temporary) residence. So theoretically the migrants have access to 
certain benefits, but the entitlement is stopped automatically and almost immediately 
after claiming the benefit.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 give an indication of recipients of social benefits by different groups. The 
categories are broken down into the four major immigrant groups (Turkish, Moroccan, 
Surinamese and Antillean), other non-western, non-western total and natives as a 
comparison group. From this table it is clear that each of the non-Western immigrant 
groups are more often found among the beneficiaries for all social protection benefits but 
most outspokenly for disability related benefits and social welfare benefits.  
 
Table 2: Recipients of social benefits, age 15-64 years, September 2004, the 
Netherlands (in percentage of population)  
inability 
benefits
unemployment 
benefits
social 
welfare 
other 
benefits
Turkish 29 13 4 11 3
Moroccan 29 9 3 16 2
Surinamese 23 8 4 10 2
Antillean 24 4 3 16 2
other non-western 22 3 2 16 1
non-western total 25 7 3 14 2
natives 13 8 2 2 2
total share social 
security beneficiaries 
within group
of which:
 
Source: CBS Statline, SCP Jaarrapport Integratie 2007 pp. 154 
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Table 3  
 
(Roodenburg, Euwals, & Rele, 2003) 
 
Among non-western migrants, the Turkish and Moroccans are receiving social benefits 
relatively more often than other ethnic groups. Moroccans are the group most dependent 
upon social welfare payments of those who have access to social benefits.  On the 
contrary, social welfare dependency is considerably lower for Surinamese migrants than 
for other non-western groups, which may be explained by the relatively high level of 
female economic activity and thus independence from the welfare system (Dagevos & 
Gijsberts, 2007).  
 
Table 3 illustrates the same reality in a different way. Based on somewhat more 
sophisticated modeling by the Social Planning Bureau for the period 1999 -2002, it is 
estimated that the relative claim on expenditures for social protection is much higher for 
all non-Western migrants than for the average Dutch. The last column of table 3, however, 
adds more specific information. It can be seen that the relative claim on social 
expenditures is lower for highly skilled migrants than for the average Dutch. This 
actually tells a special story for the entitlements of migrants in the Dutch social protection 
system. As can be noticed from the more detailed historical account of the position of 
migrants provided in the table of the appendix, migrants in fact had and have less social 
rights than the average Dutch throughout history. The fact that non-western migrant, 
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nevertheless use social protection more often than the average Dutch has to be explained 
by the vulnerability to economic downturns and the resulting lower labour market  
participation rates for migrants compared to the average Dutch person. Moreover, the 
largest part of migrant beneficiaries are members of the migrant community that 
immigrated in the period 1960 – 1980 and stayed in the country for a long period. Their 
prolonged stay lead to permanent residence permits thus making them entitled to 
receiving social benefits. The period 1960 – 1980 coincided with a high level of 
generosity of benefits also for the Dutch population. Since, however, migrant residents 
found their way back to the labour market far less easily in the periods of economic 
growth starting the mid-80s, they became overrepresented among the beneficiaries. The 
overrepresentation of migrants among social benefits recipients is not a reflection of their 
large scale entitlement but rather of their unfavourable labour market position. 
 
For the migrants from recent cohorts, the story is very different. This group of migrants 
have no or very limited access to social protection. This applies especially to the lower 
skilled migrants. Their residence permit is directly linked to their labour contract and 
regulations stipulate that they immediately loose their residence permit when they would 
claim social assistance benefits. The lower skilled migrants became less numerous 
especially in the 21st century, thus reducing the “burden” of migrant workers on the social 
system. In fact when the highly skilled migrants (mostly stemming from recent 
immigration cohorts) are considered, it can be seen that their use of social protection 
benefits is in fact lower than the claim of average Dutch (see table 3). 
 
Three mechanisms have reduced the use of social protection benefits by the migrant 
workers over the last decade: 
- first the composition of the migrants have been changed over the last 10 year with 
less asylum seekers, less immigrants coming in for family reasons, less low 
skilled workers and more highly skilled workers; this leads to less need for 
migrants to use the social protection system since highly skilled workers are less 
vulnerable to unemployment and other forms of involuntary economic inactivity; 
- since the 1990’s the Dutch government has implemented an activation policy for 
social benefits recipients; this has pushed a large number of people (temporary) 
back the labour market; it has pushed more migrant workers back to the labour 
markets for the simple reason that they were overrepresented among the non-
active social benefit recipients; 
- third the implementation of the linkage act has made it practically impossible for 
migrants to claim social benefits since this would lead immediately to the loss of 
their resident permits or the a refusal of renewal of the resident permit at a 
specific time. 
 
According to Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2006), the Dutch government 
approved measures aimed at preventing foreigners temporarily residing in the 
Netherlands from applying for welfare, proposed by State Secretary of Social Affairs and 
Employment (Henk van Hoof) and Immigration and Integration Minister (Rita Verdonk). 
The first measure was an amendment to the Work and Welfare Act.  It specifically states 
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that people are only eligible for welfare if they “reside in the Netherlands”. Furthermore, 
EU residents, who are allowed to stay in the Netherlands for a three month period from 
May 1st 2006, will be not be entitled to welfare. They also brought closer cooperation 
between municipalities and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS). This will 
make it easier for the INS to decide more quickly and efficiently about extending the 
residence permit of migrants who apply for welfare, effectively meaning that anyone on 
welfare will not receive and renewed permit. In most cases a migrant is not automatically 
entitled to welfare benefits but he/she must first accrue welfare rights (Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Employment, 2005). 
It should be noted that this leads to an important asymmetry in the treatment of migrant 
workers. On the one hand, they are practically excluded form receiving social benefits. 
On the other hand they (and their employers) have to contribute to the financing of the 
social protection system by paying taxes and social security contributions. Dutch law 
does not allow to exempt migrants from paying into a system wherein they are deprived 
of rights to profit form the system. The logic is that exempting migrants from social taxes 
and contributions would lead to unfair competition between them and the native Dutch 
since the wage costs for the latter would be higher in case the former group is has to be 
paid a lower gross salary.  
 
Heath care for asylum seekers and refugees  
 
The first group of non-European refugees arrived in the Netherlands in the 1970s. At this 
time they were incorporated into the regular health care system. By the end of the 1970s, 
the Dutch government realized that refugees had some specify health needs so which it 
was difficult for them to find help due to their migratory background (violence, 
deprivation, uprooting and acculturation) (Ruuk, 2003). 
  
In 1979 the Refugee Health Care Centre was established as part of the Ministry of Health. 
It offered a first medical reception to invited refugees, and since 1987 also to asylum 
seekers, gave assistance and counselling to refugees already in the Netherlands and 
served as a bridge to regular health care by giving advice, consultation, courses and 
training. Children were proved for by the medical team in cooperation with local child 
health care serves (Ruuk, 2003). 
   
The aim of the medical reception is to increase the accessibility of regular health care for 
refugees and asylum seekers. The purpose is to function as a bridge to the regular health 
care institutions and to inform the GP and other primary health care workers in the 
municipality, in which the refugee is housed, of his health problems and their social and 
violence-related background, and giving them advice about further support and assistance 
(Ruuk, 2003). 
 
In 2000, GGD Nederland, the COA and the Ministries of Justice and Public Health 
decided that asylum seekers should receive medical care from regular (mental) health 
care institutions, instead of being treated in the reception centres. Asylum seekers would 
be given more responsibility over their own medical care and the medical reception in the 
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centres could give more attention to prevention and education (Ruuk, 2003). Since 
January 1, 2000, medical care for asylum seekers has been placed within the regular 
health care system. 
 
 
4 Undocumented migrants in the Netherlands 
While little information is generally available on undocumented migrants in the 
Netherlands, we present a number of estimates that aim to provide a first indication of the 
nature and extent of the phenomenon in the country. According to estimates of Heijden, 
Gils, Cruijff, & Hessen (2006) for the period of April 2005-2006, the number of illegal 
residents in the country was approximately 129,000 persons including 88,000 illegal 
residents of non-European origin and 41,000 illegal residents from European countries. 
The authors further estimate that this figure includes around 8,500 former asylum seekers. 
 
According to Engbersen et al.(2002), the number of legally working illegal residents has 
nearly ceased to exist, which suggests that the implementation of the Linkage Law has 
resulted in the formal labour market to become blocked for illegal residents. The Linkage 
Law further ensures that illegal residents cannot make use of the social security system 
anymore. This, possibly coupled with fiercer labour inspections on legal employment 
relations has furthermore led to the increase of illegal work outside the observable 
relations. This shows in the increase of skimpy employment intermediation bureaus that 
has further increased the dependency of illegal residents on them as well as family and 
friend networks. In practice, this has led to illegal residents pursuing the same work as 
before but facing worse work conditions. Illegal employment is common especially in the 
hotel and catering, personal services, farming and cleaning sectors where labour 
inspections are relatively more difficult. The illegal population is estimated to be 
unequally spread throughout the country with high concentration in the four big cities of 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht, as well as in the regions with high demand 
for low-skilled workers in the farming and horticulture industry.  Undocumented 
migrants are not eligible for social protection schemes. 
The Linkage Act (Koppelingswet, 1998) made the situation for undocumented migrants 
for difficult and precarious with regard to health care and other social provisions (i.e. 
public housing). Some undocumented migrants who were receiving social benefits before 
the Koppelingswet was introduced continue to receive benefits either from the social 
service or from special funds created by local governments. On some occasions 
municipalities decide to offer reception facilities to some undocumented migrants. 
Foreigners without legal residence were to be excluded from health insurance. This 
resulted in a difficult situation for medical providers as well as illegal immigrants. 
Medical  providers  had  the  continued  obligation  to  provide health support in cases of 
emergency but they  no  longer  were  provided  with  the  financial  means  to  cover  
treatment costs  for  illegal  immigrants. A precondition to the  acceptance  of  the 
Linkage Law was  that  medical  care  was  still  available  in  case  of ‘urgent need’ as 
well as for the prevention of public health danger (the Linking Act changed Article 8b of 
 13
the Dutch Aliens Act) (Beckers, 2006). Due to strong opposition, the minister responsible 
changed the definition of ‘urgent medical care’, and stated that every doctor has an 
obligation to help anybody regardless of his or her position in society, race, belief, etc. 
Instead of the word ‘urgent’, the term ‘necessary’ is used (PICUM, 2002).Cases that are 
considered are:  
• In case of or for the prevention of life threatening situations, or situations of 
permanent loss of essential functions.  
• In case there is a danger for a third party, e.g. certain contagious diseases (in 
particular TB) and for psychological disturbances and consequent aggressive 
behaviour.  
• Pregnancy care (before and during birth).  
• Access for children without a status to preventive Health Care and to a 
vaccination programme similar to the national vaccination programme.  
Because of many misunderstanding in the meaning of what is covered, to ensure that 
these medical costs were not to be born by the providers, two legal provisions were 
implemented by the government.  First, provision is for hospitalization. Hospitals have a 
special write-off for unpaid bills (‘dubieuze debiteuren’).  The Koppelingsfonds (i.e. 
Linkage Fund), with an initial budget of € 5 million was set  up  to  cover  primary  
medical  costs,  such  as  doctors,  obstetricians  and pharmacies (to compensate doctors 
for the loss of earnings).  The  government  enabled  hospitals,  rehab  centers  and  
ambulatory health  clinics  to  set  up  a  budget  to  cover  for  unpaid  bills  (i.e.  
dubieuze debiteuren)  from  treatment  of  illegal  immigrants(Beckers, 2006).   
   
4 Understanding informal social protection in the Netherlands 
 
What happens when immigrants do not have access to formal social protection systems in 
the Netherlands? When migrants do not have access to formal social protection they turn 
to other means to gain social protection (protection from risk and vulnerability). The 
theoretical framework of the Welfare Pentagon explains these possibilities for other 
forms of social protection. The Welfare Pentagon embodies the five central institutions 
that households or individuals could use to assuage needs in a given society (family, 
markets, social networks, membership institutions and public authorities), see Figure 1.2 
Even though historical and geographical appearances differ, these institutions are found 
in all societies across time and locations. The relevance of each institution and the 
exchanges between households and these institutions may differ by society and over time. 
 
Figure 1. The Welfare Pentagon 
                                                 
2 The Welfare Pentagon is a central and distinctive element in the 'Social Risk Management' approach as 
developed by de Neubourg (2002) and (Neubourg & Weigand, 2000). The Social Risk Management 
framework is formulated to analyze the role and scope of public interventions and foremost, but not 
exclusively, that of public social protection policies.  
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Source: (Neubourg, 2002) 
Households use the institutions of the Welfare Pentagon in their livelihood strategy in 
order to generate income but also to smooth consumption; labour markets, product 
markets and capital markets allow households to trade and exchange in order to secure 
resources to satisfy the main needs at a certain moment. On the labour market households 
exchange effort for a (future) wage; on product markets households trade effort for a 
(future) profit; on the capital market households trade income for future income by 
investments, savings, insurances, borrowings and the like. Families, social networks and 
membership institutions address the livelihood risk by means of various (and different) 
mechanisms of solidarity. Membership institutions are institutions of which individuals 
can become a “member” and from which they can resign (households or individuals enter 
and exit membership institutions). Examples of such institutions are unions, mutual 
insurance companies, religious organisations, co-operatives or neighbourhood 
associations. As the fifth corner of the Welfare Pentagon, public authorities can assist 
households directly by means of public social protection (pension schemes, child benefits, 
unemployment insurance and other forms of social insurance) but also indirectly by 
enforcing contracts through a judicial system, introducing legislation aimed at correcting 
market failures (such as minimum reserve requirements for banks so that the savings of 
the households are guaranteed) and many other public actions. Although it is hard and 
unusual for households to go without the institutions of a welfare pentagon, households 
can also internalize income generating activities and consumption smoothing by autarchic 
home production, accumulating physical assets or holding cash savings.  
In order to be able to follow a particular consumption smoothing strategy, households and 
individuals need access to the relevant institutions of the welfare pentagon. Obtaining a 
social security benefit requires access to the public authorities that control the social 
benefit; obtaining a (legal) wage depends on your access to the (legal) labour market; 
getting support from a family member implies having access to a family. In addition to 
access to a particular institution, a specific consumption smoothing strategies typically 
also requires some kind of asset. Assets can be financial (cash, money on a bank account, 
stocks), physical (land, house, life stock, machines, jewellery), human (education, skills), 
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social (family ties, acquaintances, trust) or collective (citizenship, contribution record). 
For instance, households can buy insurance against certain risks on financial markets 
using part of their financial assets to pay the insurance premium. Alternatively, 
households can be insured for certain risks by public authorities through paying taxes or 
social insurance contributions or simply by being a citizen. On the other hand, they can 
rely on social networks or family to compensate them after a shock occurs. Depending on 
the characteristics of these arrangements a social input is required. This input can take the 
form of a promise of reciprocity, a ‘good’ reputation or a family relation. 
So far we implicitly assumed that all households are equal. However, households differ in 
their initial endowments due to two main reasons: firstly, they are not equal in their 
capacity to produce wealth (e.g. for reasons related to household composition, health, 
intrinsic productivity etc.) and secondly, they are “born in an income distribution” 
(allowing for endowed wealth to be passed from past generations to present ones). These 
are important differences because their existence implies that households differ in the 
access to the institutions and assets of the welfare pentagon, thus in their access to the 
consumption smoothing channels and thus in their capacity to follow a successful 
livelihood strategy. Households also differ in their exposure to risks (meaning that some 
households are plagued by more “bad luck” than others) and in their preferences. Two 
sets of preferences are important in this respect: the preferences defining the “needs” of 
the household members (see also footnote 11) and the preferences regarding to degree of 
risk aversion they find acceptable3.  
As a result of the differences spelled out above (initial endowment, needs definition and 
degree of risk aversion), households adopt different income generating and consumption 
smoothing strategies or in other words, households differ in their consumption smoothing 
portfolio or in their particular place in the 5-dimensional space defined by the Welfare 
Pentagon. The theoretical framework allows households to choose many “points of 
welfare production within the 5-dimensional welfare space” all leading to the satisfaction 
of their needs. As already indicated, several institutions are active in providing assistance 
with the same consumption smoothing strategy. A part of the population may not have 
access to a particular consumption smoothing channel because it lacks the required assets 
to establish an exchange relationship with an institutional counterpart. Figure 2 illustrates 
the consumption smoothing decision and the different factors affecting it. 
Figure 2. The consumption smoothing decision 
                                                 
3 The degree of risk exposure of households is not just randomly distributed among households in a 
particular society but is positively biased towards the “poorly endowed” households, meaning that poor 
households run higher risks to be confronted with “bad luck” because they are concentrated in 
neighbourhoods with a higher than average propensity to e.g. crime, physical damage due to earthquakes, 
flooding, drought, bad harvests and health hazards due e.g. to bad water conditions.  
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The results of the differences in the economic activities of households (production points 
in the welfare pentagon space), which can include migration, lead to an income 
distribution and a corresponding consumption distribution. In that distribution, some 
households can smooth consumption and satisfy their needs and some others are “poor” 
in the sense that they have not enough means to smooth consumption so that their needs 
are always satisfied. 
In the case of undocumented migrants in the Netherlands, they usually do not have access 
to the formal parts of the welfare pentagon like formal labor markets and formal social 
protection via public institutions. In this case, undocumented migrants will turn to in 
formal parts of the welfare pentagon. They will work in the informal economy, they will 
use their personal networks and family more where it is possible to deal with their needs. 
 
5 Conclusions 
Immigrant access to social protection in the Netherlands has changed quite noticeably 
over time but immigrants have always been in a lesser position when compared with 
natives with regard to access to social protection. In the early years of migration social 
protection was limited for migrants since they were intended to return to their country of 
origin. Once it became clear that many migrants where in the Netherlands to stay it 
because increasingly clear that they would also need access to social protection. The 
system was quite generous for both natives and immigrants in the 70s and 80s. In the 90s, 
benefits were cut back for everyone. It is more difficult to stay a beneficiary for a longer 
period of time. The most notable changes have come since 2000. 
 
Three major events have made drastic changes to the social protection situation of 
migrants. First the composition of the migrants have been changed over the last 10 year 
with less asylum seekers, less immigrants coming in for family reasons, less low skilled 
workers and more highly skilled workers; this leads to less need for migrants to use the 
Need for 
consumption 
smoothing 
Outcome: 
Point on 
welfare 
pentagon 
chosen
Different needs 
preferences 
Different 
exposure to risks 
Risk aversion 
preferences 
Different 
endowments 
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social protection system since highly skilled workers are less vulnerable to 
unemployment and other forms of involuntary economic inactivity. Since the 1990’s the 
Dutch government has implemented an activation policy for social benefits recipients; 
this has pushed a large number of people (temporary) back the labour market; it has 
pushed more migrant workers back to the labour markets for the simple reason that they 
were overrepresented among the non-active social benefit recipients. The implementation 
of the linkage act has made it practically impossible for migrants to claim social benefits 
since this would lead immediately to the loss of their resident permits or the a refusal of 
renewal of the resident permit at a specific time. 
 
It has become increasing clear that there is a mismatch between contributions of migrants 
(particularly non-permanent migrants) and their access to social protection. Since 
everything is linked to the duration of stay and residence permits will not be renewed 
with out more or less perfect conditions of the migrant (including always working and 
having health issuance) it becomes almost impossible for many migrants to benefit from 
the contributions they (and their employers) make. 
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Timeline Immigration policy Integration policy Immigration empirics/ 
trends 
Social policy implications 
After-war period The right to repatriate to the 
Netherlands from Indonesia  
 
 
No need perceived for an 
explicit integration policy 
 
 
 
Immigration as a 
decolonization process: 
repatriation from 
Indonesia; migration from 
the Caribbean territories 
Legal migrant have 
limited rights 
1960s 
(economic 
expansion) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Labour recruitment agreements: 
Spain (1961), Portugal (1963), 
Turkey (1964), Greece (1966), 
Morocco (1969), Yugoslavia and 
Tunisia (1970) 
 
Lenient policy enforcement: 
possible retroactive 
regularization of a residence 
status  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Integration as a welfare policy 
 
Lack of coordinated central 
government intervention  
 
Support for own ethnic cultural 
education and mother-tongue 
teaching 
 
Private actors involved in 
welfare services provision 
Large-scale labour 
immigration though 
recruitment channels as 
well as unofficial channels
Legal migrant have 
limited rights 
1966-67 
(first recession) 
 
Work permit restrictions for the 
unofficial migrants 
 
 
Limited effects of  
recession on immigration 
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1970s (economic 
recovery) 
“Memorandum Foreign 
Employees”:  
- refusal to consider the 
Netherlands as an 
immigration country  
- recognition of 
immigrants’ contribution 
for the Dutch economy  
- proposal for a rotation 
system 
 
Peak in immigration 
 
Continuing permanent 
relocation of newcomers:  
immigration from 
Suriname;  
family reunification from 
Morocco  and Turkey 
 
Permanent settlement of 
many guest-workers 
(mostly Turkish and 
Moroccan workers) 
 
1974-“Memorandum of 
Reply”, explicitly stated 
that the Netherlands had 
responsibilities to the 
guest workers and that, a 
policy to accommodate 
them in the Dutch society 
as long as they would 
remain in the country, was 
imperative.  
 
This accommodating 
policy had two main 
elements: giving guest 
workers improved access 
to public services/social 
security and providing 
cultural support. As for 
the access to public 
services, housing was a 
priority but later, as 
migrant workers became 
more regionally 
concentrated, 
municipalities started to 
provide better access to 
health care, social 
assistance based income 
support and education. 
1973 -(second 
recession) 
The end of recruitment for 
foreign workers  
 
Tighter control of immigration 
 
Internationally oriented 
approach: objective to change 
the structural conditions as the 
cause of migration 
 
1974 “Memorandum of Reply”: 
- limit labour migration to 
a minimum  
- immigration considered 
temporary 
- recognition of obligations 
towards immigrants  
- integration with 
preservation of cultural 
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identity 
Implementation of REMPLOD 
programme: 
Encouragement of return 
migration; support the 
establishment of new businesses 
by returnees 
1980s 
(recognition of 
immigration) 
Further efforts to limit 
immigration: visa requirements 
for countries with high 
emigration potential 
 
Easing the requirements for 
family migration  
 
Foreign Employees Act 
‘Minorities Policy’: 
- immigrants expected to 
stay permanently 
- need for more 
integration policies 
- aims to stimulate 
equality of vulnerable 
groups 
- preservation of own 
cultural identity 
 
Projects for language training 
of minorities to learn Dutch 
 
Aims for improvement of 
minorities’ labour market 
position  
 
Enabling foreigners full access 
to social housing 
Continuing and peaking 
family migration 
A peak in asylum-seekers 
migration 
A peak in migration from 
Suriname 
 
Legal migrants have full 
rights to social security. 
There is a generous 
system for everyone. 
1983 ‘Memorandum Minorities 
Policy’:  
- recognition of 
immigration  
- favourable for family 
migration 
 
 22
1990s Restrictions on family migration  
 
Attempts to reduce irregular 
migration 
 
Move from collective ethnic 
policy (multiculturalism) 
towards a more individualistic 
approach 
 
Policy focus on new 
immigrants in disadvantaged 
situations  
 
Focus on housing, education, 
employment; less emphasis on 
cultural dimensions 
 
Decentralization of integration 
policy 
Requests for refugee 
status remain high 
Social Security legislation 
changes for everyone. It is 
more difficult to stay a 
beneficiary for a longer 
period of time. 
1994  Equal Treatment Act: covers 
domains such as education, 
employment, housing, and the 
provision of goods and 
services 
  
1995 Foreign Workers Employment 
Act:  
- priority labour supply for 
workers within EEA 
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1996  Act regulating adult and 
vocational education: 
establishment of Regional 
Education Centres for 
provision of Dutch language 
training, adult and vocational 
training  
  
1998 Linkage Act: exclusion of 
irregular immigrants from public 
services 
‘Newcomers Integration Act’: 
obligation for new immigrants 
to follow courses of language 
and civic orientation and 
orientation training for 
education or employment 
  
“Covenants”: agreements 
between the government, trade 
associations and companies for 
improvement of employment 
conditions for ethnic minorities
 
2000s  
(business- 
oriented policy) 
Tightened restriction for 
migration of low-skilled, 
irregular migration, family 
migration 
 
Encouragement of skilled 
 Slight drop in family 
migration  
 
Increase in migration from 
new EU member states 
(mainly Poland) 
 
Employment insurance 
compulsory (linked to 
legal residency) giving 
entitlements to 
unemployment, disability, 
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migration  Drop in requests for 
refugee status 
illness, etc. 
 
Linkage Law brought into 
force making access to the 
social system of the 
country more difficult. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Health insurance 
compulsory for all legal 
residence from Jan.1, 
2006. 
 
Permanent residences 
have most entitlements.  
2001 Aliens Act: tightens the criteria 
for a refugee status; introduced a 
fast-track assessment 
Creation of a new Minister for 
Integration and Immigration 
2004 Transition period for workers 
from the new EU member states 
 
2004 Knowledge Migrant Scheme: 
encouraging and facilitating 
immigration of highly-skilled 
migrants 
 
 
 
2005  The Law on Integration 
Abroad: civic integration test 
as a requirement for family 
migration 
2006 “Memorandum Toward A 
Modern Migration Policy”: 
The focus on needs of Dutch 
economy and society.  
 
2006 Scheme for self-employed: 
removing the obstacles  
 
2007 “Pardon Scheme”: grants 
residency permit to aliens who 
submitted an asylum application 
under the old Aliens Act and still 
live in the Netherlands 
The civic integration test no 
longer required, but still need 
to be passed to be able to 
acquire the permanent 
citizenship status 
 
Civic integration duty 
extended to oldcomers not 
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holding Dutch citizenship Nonpermanent residences 
have limited access to 
social protection in reality. 
 
2007 The end of transition period for 
workers from eight new member 
states 
 
Source: De Neubourg, Beckers and Hercog (2008) and own contributions on social protection 
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Appendix: Current Social Security System in the Netherlands 
(Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2008) 
 
General Child Benefit Act (AKW)  
The General Child Benefit Act (AKW) offers people living and working in the 
Netherlands a financial allowance (child benefit) for the costs of care and maintenance of 
children up to the age of 18.  
Who is eligible?  
Parents of children up to the age of 18 are entitled to child benefit. The amount of the 
child benefit depends on the age of the child. With regard to children born before 1 
January 1995 the size of the family is also taken into account. A child counts as one or 
two children for benefit purposes depending on whether the child lives at home or away 
from home, any income from labour the child might have and, in certain cases, the size of 
the parental support contribution. 
 
General Old Age Pensions Act (AOW)  
The AOW provides entitlement to old age pension for people who are aged 65 and over.  
Who is eligible? If you have been living in the Netherlands between your 15th and 65th 
birthday, you will be entitled to AOW. Entitlement to AOW pension is accumulated at a 
rate of 2% for each year of insurance. A person who has not lived continuously in the 
Netherlands between the ages of 15 and 65 and therefore has not been insured 
continuously, will not receive a full AOW pension. A 2% reduction is made on the full 
pension for each year of non-insurance. 
 
Sickness Benefits Act (ZW)  
The Dutch Civil Code stipulates that employers must continue to pay at least 70% of the 
sick employees’ salaries for the first two years of their sick leave. In the first year of 
sickness this amount should not be less than the applicable minimum income. The 
employer continues paying salary until the employee has been on sick leave for 104 
weeks, but never longer than the duration of the contract. Persons who no longer have an 
employer can claim sickness benefit under the Sickness Benefits Act.  
Who is eligible?  
The Sickness BenefitsAct only serves as a safety net for people who have no (longer an) 
employer and in some special situations. These are for instance the following persons:  
• employees who lost their job in the first two years of their sickness benefit;  
• temporary workers without a permanent contract with the temping agency;  
• persons voluntarily insured;  
• home workers;  
• trainees;  
• unemployed people.  
In addition, in the following circumstances sickness benefits may be claimed:  
• on sickness prior to or following on from the 16 weeks of maternity benefit to which 
employees and civil servants are entitled under the Work and Care Act;  
• on the bankruptcy of the employer who continues to pay the salary;  
• on sickness in the first five years after an employee with a no-risk policy has entered 
employment (with regard to people entitled to Wajong, on sickness for an unlimited 
period of time);  
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• on sickness caused by an organ donation. 
 
Disability Insurance Act (WAO)  
The WAO was succeeded on 1 January 2006 by the Work and Income according to 
Labour Capacity Act (WIA). If you are already on WAO benefit, you remain covered by 
the WAO. But you can be re-examined according to more stringent criteria.This may 
have consequences for the level of your benefit.  
Who is eligible?  
Only people who became ill before 1 January 2004. 
 
Work and Income according to Labour Capacity Act (WIA)  
The WIA provides for employees entitled to occupational disability benefit upon full and 
permanent occupational disability. Those still able to work partially will receive a 
supplement to their wage.  
Who is eligible?  
For employees who became ill on or after 1 January 2004, a qualifying period of 104 
weeks applies. Then, they are entitled to benefit under the WIA, provided they are at least 
35% occupationally disabled. 
 
Unemployment Insurance Act (WW)  
The WW insures employees and civil servants who become unemployed against the 
financial consequences of unemployment. As of 1 October 2006, a lot has changed in the 
duration and amount of the benefit.  
Who is eligible?  
In order to become eligible for WW benefit you must at least:  
• be below the age of 65;  
• lose at least five working hours per week (or for those working less than ten hours per 
week, at least half the working hours);  
• no longer be entitled to wages for these lost working hours;  
• be available for work;  
• not be on Sickness benefit, WAO benefit upon full occupational disability, or IVA 
benefit;  
• not be in receipt of WGA benefit (unless you had a job in addition to the WGA benefit 
and lost that job);  
• meet the requirement of ‘26 out of 36 weeks’: you must have been employed for at least 
26 weeks in the 36 weeks before the first day of unemployment. Weeks during which you 
carried out work as a self-employed person do not count. Weeks which have already been 
incorporated with regard to a previous benefit do not count. 
 
Self-employed Persons Disablement Benefits Act (WAZ)  
The WAZ was abolished as of 1 August 2004.The WAZ used to insure self-employed 
persons, professionally collaborating spouses and professionals such as managing 
directors/majority shareholders and home care workers, against a loss of income resulting 
from long-term occupational disability.  
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Only self-employed persons who became occupationally disabled before that date could, 
after a qualifying period of one year (so by 1 August 2005 at the latest), be eligible to 
receive WAZ benefit.  
A self-employed person who was already on WAZ benefit on 1 August 2005 will  
continue to receive this as long as the following benefit conditions are met:  
• the self-employed person is more than 25% occupationally disabled;  
• the self-employed person is younger than 65;  
• the income at the time of the illness was (partly) earned by working as a selfemployed 
person.  
Alternative insurance  
Self-employed persons may now take out private insurance against the risk of 
occupational disability. A person who appears to have difficulty in obtaining insurance is 
eligible for an alternative insurance if he applies for a private insurance within three 
months after having started up his business.  
People entitled to WAZ benefit who are declared fully fit for work after a re-examination 
and who do not have a supplementary private occupational disability insurance can also 
make use of the alternative insurance if they apply for a private insurance within three 
months after the WAZ benefit was ended.  
No medical acceptance or age limit applies to this alternative insurance. 
 
Disablement Assistance Act for Handicapped Young Persons (Wajong)  
The Wajong makes provision for a minimum benefit for young handicapped persons.  
Who is eligible?  
A person is eligible for Wajong benefit if he is living in the Netherlands, is below the age 
of 65, and  
• is at least 25% occupationally disabled on the date on which he reaches the age of 17, or  
• becomes at least 25% occupationally disabled after this date (but before his 30th 
birthday) and has been a student for at least six months in the year prior to the 
occupational disability. 
 
Regulations governing Contributions towards the Upkeep of Disabled Children 
living at Home (TOG)  
The TOG scheme provides for an additional allowance, apart from child benefit, to 
parents for the upkeep of a disabled child living at home.  
Who is eligible?  
A person living in the Netherlands and caring for a disabled child at home is eligible for 
the allowance under the following conditions:  
• the disability of the child is the consequence of one or more disorders of a physical, 
intellectual or mental nature on the basis of which a positive indication could be given for 
admission to a AWBZ institution;  
• because of the disability, the child is considerably more dependent on care, guidance 
and supervision than a healthy child of the same age;  
• the child is aged at least 3 years and not older than 17.  
From the age of 18 onwards, the child itself can become eligible for benefit under the 
Disablement Assistance Act for Handicapped Young Persons (Wajong). 
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Supplementary Benefits Act (TW)  
The Supplementary Benefits Act supplements benefits up to the guaranteed minimum 
income if the total income of the person entitled to the benefit and his partner, if any, is 
below this.  
Who is eligible?  
People entitled to ZW, WW, WAZ, Wajong, WAO, WIA or Wamil benefit. A 
supplement is sometimes also possible on top of the benefit in connection with pregnancy, 
delivery, adoption and foster care under the Work and Care Act. 
 
Act on Income Provisions for Older or Partially Disabled Unemployed Persons 
(IOAW)  
The IOAW provides an income guarantee to older unemployed persons at the level of the 
guaranteed minimum income.  
Who is eligible?  
• Unemployed persons aged 50 when they became unemployed and who have received 
wage-related benefits (plus the subsequent benefit if they were still entitled to them) 
under the Unemployment Insurance Act (WW);  
• Persons who are partially occupationally disabled and were already in receipt of IOAW 
benefit on 28 December 2005 and who are not entitled to a supplement under the 
Supplementary Benefits Act, because they have a partner born after 31 December 1971 
and do not have a child at home below the age of twelve years.  
IOAW benefit links with WW benefit.  
IOAW benefit supplements the total income of the unemployed and their partner (income 
from labour, benefits, pensions) bringing it up to the guaranteed minimum income level.  
Assets, such as a private home or savings, are disregarded. 
 
 
Act on Income Provisions for Older or Partially Disabled Formerly Self-employed 
Persons (IOAZ)  
The IOAZ provides an income guarantee to older self-employed persons at the level of 
the guaranteed minimum income.  
Who is eligible?  
• Self-employed persons aged 55 or over who, according to expectations, derive income 
from a profession or from business activities which is less than the calculated minimum 
income for self-employed persons (€ 19.708,-) and are thus forced to end their 
professional or business activities.  
• Claimants only qualify if their average annual income has been below € 21.914,- for the 
three years preceding the claim and is not expected to exceed € 19.708,- in the future.  
• A claimant must have been engaged in business or professional activities for at least ten 
years, or three years with seven years in employment prior to this.  
• Persons who are partially occupationally disabled and were already in receipt of IOAZ 
benefit on 28 December 2005 and who are not entitled to a supplement under the 
Supplementary Benefits Act, because they have a partner born after 31 December 1971 
and do not have a child at home below the age of twelve years.  
The benefit becomes payable after the profession or business activities have ceased. The 
IOAZ benefit supplements the total income of the claimant and his partner (income from 
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labour, benefits, pensions) up to the guaranteed minimum income level. Assets up to a 
value of € 117.004,- are disregarded. The extra assets are regarded as yielding 4% annual 
returns, which will be deducted from the benefit. An amount of not more than € 110.933,- 
for supplementary pension provisions will not be taken into account with regard to people 
who are in receipt of IOAZ benefit and have a pension deficit. 
 
 
Work and Benefits Act (WWB)  
The WWB provides a minimum income for all persons residing legally in the 
Netherlands with insufficient financial resources to meet their essential living costs. You 
are required to do your utmost to support yourself again and you are obliged to take on 
generally accepted employment. If you are not successful in getting back to work, the 
social services, the CWI and/or a reintegration organisation may offer you support in 
finding work or schooling.  
If, for instance, you are in receipt of maintenance, benefits or income from paid work, the 
Act provides a top-up to the social assistance level. Assets above a certain amount are 
taken into consideration (there is an allowance of € 10.650,- for families and € 5.325,- for 
single persons). If the assets are tied up in a house, the assistance will be given in the 
form of a loan (equitable mortgage) that must be repaid. In that event, there is an asset 
allowance of not more than € 44.900,-.  
The WWB provides for national standards for persons aged between 18 and 21,between 
21 and 65 and for persons aged 65 or over. The Act makes a distinction between:  
• married couples, registered partners or unmarried partners cohabiting;  
• single parents (caring for one or more children under the age of 18);  
• single persons.  
Each group has a separate standard amount. For married couples and cohabiting partners 
aged between 21 and 65 this is 100% of the net minimum wage, for single parents aged 
between 21 and 65 this is 70%, and for single persons aged between 21 and 65 this is 
50%.  
The point of departure for the standard amount for single parents and single persons is 
that (housing) expenses can be shared with other people. If this is not or is only partly the 
case, the municipal authorities can award a supplementary allowance of no more than 
20% of the net minimum wage.  
People aged 65 or over who have not built-up a full AOW pension can receive a 
supplement under the WWB up to the level of the net AOW pension.  
The level for young persons between the ages of 18 and 21 is based on the child benefit. 
If these young persons are faced with higher essential living costs, then their parents are 
responsible for these. If they cannot rely on their parents, they may be able to receive 
income supplement via the special assistance scheme. The local authorities determine the 
level of special assistance.  
 
The ZVW  
The Zvw is a form of insurance against medical expenses.All persons residing in the 
Netherlands, who have AWBZ insurance by law, are obliged to take out a healthcare 
insurance, because everyone who requires medical care must be able to receive it.  
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The healthcare insurance consists of a basic package. In addition, it is possible to take out 
supplementary healthcare insurances on an individual basis. Insurers are required by law 
to accept anyone who registers for the basic insurance.The composition of the basic 
insurance package is determined by the government.  
What is the amount of the contribution?  
The healthcare insurers determine the amount of the fixed (nominal) healthcare 
contribution themselves.The monthly contribution can therefore differ per insurer.No 
contribution is required for children under the age of 18.In addition to the contribution to 
the healthcare insurer, an income-related contribution is paid to the government.This 
contribution is automatically withheld from wages/the benefit by the employer or benefits 
agency, but is also, in large part, reimbursed by them.  
Depending on your income, you may be eligible for an allowance: the care allowance. 
This allowance must be applied for from the tax authorities. Information about the care 
allowance can be found on www.toeslagen.nl. 
 
Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ)  
The AWBZ is a National Insurance Scheme against the risk of exceptional medical 
expenses for which people cannot be insured on an individual basis. Everyone who 
resides or works in the Netherlands has AWBZ insurance and is entitled to AWBZ-care 
reimbursement.  
AWBZ insurance provides cover against major medical risks not covered by the 
healthcare insurances. An example in this respect is admittance to an AWBZ institution 
(such as nursing and care homes), including receipt of the necessary care. An insured 
party automatically receives AWBZ insurance from his or her healthcare insurer. The 
administration of AWBZ insurance is delegated by healthcare insurers to regional 
healthcare offices.  
What is the amount of the contribution? The AWBZ contribution is income-related and is 
withheld from wages/the benefit by the employer or benefits agency. In most cases, an 
(income-related) own contribution is required when use is made of AWBZ care. 
 
Benefits abroad  
Your benefit will only be paid abroad if you live in an EU/EEA country, the Netherlands 
Antilles, Aruba or a country with which the Netherlands has entered into a treaty for 
proper control of the payment of benefits. This relates to AOW, WAO, WIA, WAZ, Anw, 
the Sickness Benefits Act and child benefit. Therefore, any person moving to a country 
with which the Netherlands does not have a treaty will lose the right to benefit.  
There is an exception with regard to the AOW.A person aged 65 does not lose the full 
right to AOW pension when he moves to a non-contracting State. However, regardless of 
the actual situation, this person will only become eligible for an AOW pension for 
married couples without a supplement (a maximum of 50% of the net minimum wage).  
You can find a current summary of the contracting states on www.szw.nl.  
 
Supplementary Benefits Act  
You will lose the right to supplementary benefit if you move abroad. Since 5 May 2005, 
you will also lose the right to supplementary benefit if you move to another country in the 
EU/EEA or to Switzerland. The following exceptions apply to this rule:  
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On the basis of case law, you will retain your supplementary benefit if you move to: 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Israel, Cape Verde Islands, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Malta, Morocco, New Zealand, Serbia-Montenegro, Slovenia, Tunisia, 
United States and South Korea. The Dutch government intends to adjust the existing 
treaties with these countries. Therefore, the export of the supplementary benefit to these 
countries will be discontinued in the future.  
Persons on disablement benefit or sickness benefit who live elsewhere in Europe 
(European Union, Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland and Switzerland), will temporarily 
keep their right to any supplement to their pension based on a transitional scheme. The 
supplementary benefit will be cut back in three stages. During 2007 these persons 
remained eligible for the benefit; on 1 January 2008 the benefit was reduced by one third. 
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